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AFTERWORD: MIND, 
IMAGINATION, AFFECT
Felicity Callard
The eight essays in ‘Mind, Imagination, Affect’ address topoi, phenomena and historical junctures as varied as the prostrate form of an individual being 
put to death in the US via the necropolitical ritual of lethal injection; the prostrate 
form of Virginia Woolf that allows her to fashion, while prone with illness and ‘as a 
“deserter” ’ of the ‘army of the upright’,1 a new relationship with words; the affective 
piety of Margery Kempe’s copious tears; the dense relationalities that narratives about 
autistic individuals, their family members and animal assistants unfurl; and Antoine 
Artaud’s autoscopic, aesthetically realised fantasies in which bodies are eviscerated 
and suspended mid-air. The differences in these essays’ rhetorical styles, modes of 
argumentation and ontological commitments are startling – not least because all essays 
are authored or co-authored by a writer within the humanities (and, more specifi cally, 
with at least some affi liation to the disciplines of English literature or philosophy or 
art history). (This should drive home to us, once again, that we should not allow 
today’s intense investment in interdisciplinarity, both within the medical humanities 
and beyond it, to render us impervious to the profound differences in objects of study, 
accounts of human experience and modes of interpretation produced through intra-
disciplinary – or intra-humanities – heterogeneity.) We move from the almost plan-
gent tones of Corinne Saunders’s concluding comments, in which she argues that by 
incorporating medieval worlds into a ‘long cultural perspective’, we, through ‘reading 
the past, [. . .] more richly read ourselves’;2 to David Herman’s energetic call for us to 
consider how a narratology beyond the human might assist with the construction of 
‘new, more sustainable individual and collective stories grounded in an expanded sense 
of the self’s relationality, its situation within wider webs of creatural life’;3 to Martyn 
Evans’s insistence on our attending to the wonder provoked by our acknowledgement 
of ourselves as ‘embodied, experiencing beings’;4 to Lisa Guenther’s biting question: 
‘Is there a meaningful distinction between a botched execution and a proper one? Or 
must we admit that there is no good way to execute a person?’5
Each essay has, then, its own affective tone. This tone is central to how each carves 
out its terrain of operations – as well as its objects of study – as being pertinent to the 
concerns of the medical humanities. Tone is also central to the means through which 
each chapter calls on, and out to, the imagination of its implied reader; and to how it 
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elaborates the looping relationships between the worlds that belong to the protago-
nists on which it focuses, the narrator’s own point of observation and address, and 
the emotional and cognitive proclivities of its imagined reader. If each is united in its 
desire to address us as interlocutors within the capacious space of the critical medical 
humanities, then those calls have very different rhythmicities, tonal ranges, modes of 
construing affective transfer, and conceptions of the political. If each of these essays is 
gathered under the three complex abstractions of mind, imagination and affect, then 
each presses those abstractions into service as much through the rhetorical turns of 
its argument as through that argument’s explicit focus on one or more of those three 
terms. What these essays show, collectively, then, is how broad are the animating 
logics that braid the threads of the medical and the humanities together, as well as 
how diverse are the reactions against – or, at times, commitments to – a humanism 
that might buttress, if not guarantee, the claims made in relation to the fi gure of the 
human that lies at those essays’ heart. In this afterword, I schematically address two 
domains – the illness narrative and the body – in which those diverse animating logics 
(and in particular those that push against a tidy humanism) play out.
Deforming the ‘Illness Narrative’ 
If one were to accept the risk of invidiousness and pull out one of the most central 
preoccupations of the interdisciplinary fi eld of medical humanities, then the illness 
narrative would surely be the selection that many would make. Rita Charon, in Narra-
tive Medicine, one of the founding texts of that fi eld, describes how ‘[d]octors, nurses, 
and social workers’, keen to complement a ‘scientifi cally competent medicine’ with 
the resources through which to ‘help a patient . . . fi nd meaning in illness and dying’, 
ended up ‘turning for help . . . to people who know about narratives, which can be 
defi ned as stories with a teller, a listener, a time course, a plot and a point’.6 Much of 
the writing that has addressed ‘illness narratives’ within the medical humanities has 
operated, as Peter Garratt, David Herman, Edward Juler and Laura Salisbury vari-
ously and cogently demonstrate, with conventional (broadly humanist) models of the 
language of illness and of the self from whom such language might issue. Analyses of 
what are too commonly taken as exemplars of an ‘illness narrative’ too assiduously 
winnow down who might be understood as a ‘narrator’ – as well as what might be 
traced as a plot, assessed as meaningful, be understood as an outcome, and be inter-
preted, to use Charon’s formulation, as a story’s ‘point’. 
The essays in this section radically enlarge the purview of each of those narratologi-
cal domains. Jonathan Cole and Shaun Gallagher, calling on the research of psycholo-
gist David McNeill, insist that gesture is not (only) an expression or representation 
of meaning, or vehicle for the communication of messages, but a mode of existing 
in the moment of speaking.7 Their analysis of the distinction that their collaborator 
Ian – the ‘patient’ within this story – makes between his gestures that he construes as 
‘throwaways’ and those that he describes as ‘constructeds’ carries fascinating, oblique 
resonances with Salisbury’s elaboration of modernism’s deep and varied interest in the 
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travails of discarded and sculpted language, as well as her interest in how phenomeno-
logical and neurological research in the mid-twentieth century opened up new means 
through which to understand the entangled relations between language, expression, 
consciousness, physiology, automaticity, meaning and communication. For Salisbury, 
to disrupt current conceptualisations of ‘illness narratives’ in the medical humanities 
requires not that we move beyond language, but that we ‘[burrow] into the resistant 
matter of language via modes that came to scientifi c, philosophical and aesthetic vis-
ibility in modernity – modes that dig into the recesses of non-propositional formula-
tions or sheer away from linear coherence’.8 One important analytic and aesthetic 
problematic that emerges in the course of reading the essays in this section – and one 
that deserves signifi cant future consideration by medical humanities scholars – is how 
to understand the relationship between Salisbury’s call to stay with the matter of lan-
guage, and Juler’s claim for the ‘non- or pre-verbal language of graphic alterity’, which 
he fi nds in Artaud, and which, on Juler’s account, represents ‘that which is linguisti-
cally inexpressible: the haptic, the material, the optical and, above all, the visceral’.9 
The matter of language – and that which lies inside, beyond and before it – has been 
an enduring concern in the humanities, not least since structuralism and its many 
theoretical aftermaths. It has been, though, in many respects under-investigated in 
much medical humanities scholarship. Several of the essays in this section correct that, 
and at the same time bring knotty problems regarding relations between the linguistic, 
graphic and affective into view. 
Before I leave illness narratives, I want to return to my juxtaposition, in the 
introduction, between the prostrate body of the individual-in-the-process-of-being-
executed and the prostrate body of an ill Virginia Woolf. What might happen to and 
with the critical medical humanities if we considered both fi gures, rather than simply 
the latter, as kernels around which ‘illness narratives’ might form? What, in other 
words, if we considered Guenther’s extraordinary essay ‘On Pain of Death’ as a per-
verse illness narrative that deforms some of the founding assumptions of that genre 
as it has been imagined within orthodox medical humanities research? Guenther, 
after all, poses questions similar or identical to many of those asked by researchers 
in the medical humanities who are keen to address the phenomenological, technical 
and intersubjective characteristics of scenes that capture or emplace an individual in 
medical or quasi-medical contexts. She asks, for example, in relation to the episte-
mological and political stakes surrounding pain experienced during execution, ‘How 
does one know if another person is feeling pain?’ She raises the intractable problem – 
as do many concerned with the absence of the patient’s ‘voice’ in accounts of medi-
cal procedures – that the only individual who could provide robust evidence about 
whether pain is being felt is precisely disqualifi ed from doing so by dint of the par-
ticular confi guration in which he is captured. She demonstrates – and here she joins 
a large cohort of researchers preoccupied with the power that the medical domain 
can wield – the potency of ‘selective [appeals] to medical authority, technology, and 
practices’.10 She notes the absence of any ‘objective test for the presence or absence 
of consciousness awareness’,11 and then describes how one of the attendees in this 
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‘quasi-medical’ scene (here, the warden) is – as in so many other medical scenes – 
positioned as having to ‘read’ the body of the prostrate body that lies before him. 
And she demonstrates how, on the state’s account, execution ‘becomes legible as yet 
another terminal disease’.12 
But, of course, the entire force of Guenther’s analysis is centred on her refusal to 
confer on this scene the gravitas of the medical, for there is no patient, no disease, no 
defensible medical practice, no commitment to understanding whether pain is being 
experienced by the one being intervened upon. There is, instead, the deliberate put-
ting to death of an individual by the state. Guenther’s essay could be said to stage a 
kind of illness narrative precisely so as to challenge – and expose – the ferocious and 
obdurate violence meted out under the cover of a quasi-medical scene. In her account, 
the narrative that the state might tell – one that is committed to conveying its ‘civilised 
methods of execution appropriate for use by a Western democratic nation’13 – is up-
turned. Guenther’s own, complex narrative, which draws specifi c attention to how the 
‘twenty-fi rst-century American death house’14 attempts to install practices of care, and 
illusions of the clinic at its heart, exposes the state as simultaneously Ubu the King – 
whose ‘obscene form of sovereignty’15 operates at a distance – and Ubu the Pen-pusher 
(in the garb of the ‘imbecilic’ functionary, who prods and fi ddles with a prostrate form 
in a room decked out in ersatz medical style).16 To consider Guenther’s essay as sitting, 
however uncomfortably, within the genre of the ‘illness narrative’ allows us to discern 
how signifi cant her narratological and political achievements are in her rupturing of 
the common ways in which the medical humanities have imagined a story’s teller, lis-
tener, time course, plot and point. 
Figuring the Body
In a section titled ‘Mind, Imagination, Affect’, the frequency with which the body is 
foregrounded is notable. Scholars of affect and emotion might well interrupt me at 
this point: How could the body not appear, given that emotion is, after all, grounded 
in and through the body? But what is striking in these essays is how the body does not 
simply appear as a guarantor for an ‘embodied emotion’, but rather as a topos worthy 
of consideration in its own right. We see this, for example, in Saunders’s insistence that 
the fl uid, pre-Cartesian imbrication of body and mind poses challenges for researchers 
in many disciplines today who are struggling to address complex, multi-sensory phe-
nomena (such as voice-hearing and visions); in Evans’s turn to the body in the course of 
his search for ‘a view of patients that does justice to their personhood and their object-
hood alike’;17 and in Garratt’s attention – as he pursues Victorian models of mental 
fatigue, and the labour of reading – to scientists’ and clinicians’ interest in the physical 
basis of aesthetic experience.18 
This turn to bodily matters is often concurrent with the author’s problematisa-
tion of where the evidence of experience lies (and what the political and aesthetic 
consequences of such a problematisation might be). We see this particularly in rela-
tion to the fugitive phenomena of voice-hearing (Saunders), pain (Guenther), visceral 
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sensations (Juler), gestures (Cole and Gallagher), depressive sadness (Garratt), and the 
particular texture of human and animal affective relationalities (Herman). In using the 
phrase ‘the evidence of experience’ (a phrase made famous by the feminist historian 
Joan Scott),19 I am thinking of how these authors often raise to visibility diffi culties in 
accounting for the source and phenomenological density of these phenomena, as well 
as in adjudicating the person (or entity) who is deemed best placed to describe and 
analyse them. Juler, for example, describes the ‘autoscopic undercurrents’ of Artaud’s 
depictions of the body, noting how they ‘echo[ed] the pathological case-studies of psy-
chophysiology’ whereby individuals claimed to observe their body, and their bodily 
organs, from the inside.20 But what might be lost if we too readily read Artaud’s aes-
thetic interventions through the lens of psychophysiological expertise? Herman turns 
in part to individual narratives of the positive effects of animal assistants for people 
who are autistic to challenge orthodox clinical models of evidence that are grounded in 
scientifi c studies reliant on particular models of treatment outcomes. Herman consid-
ers, in this respect, how the ‘use of the term “anecdote” ’ – which is commonly used 
to vitiate the potency of a story – ‘[itself might] lead to the trivialisation and neglect 
of narratives that deserve closer scrutiny’.21 And Guenther, as we have already seen, 
points to the unassailable fact that the individual who could offer robust evidence con-
cerning the phenomenological effects (physically felt, mentally endured) of the quasi-
medical intervention forced upon him is structurally disqualifi ed from doing so. These 
essays, as a whole, then, displace in various ways the fi gure of the singular subject 
construed as a locus for authentic, legible and/or discursively audible communications. 
In many of the essays within this section, there is, at the same time, a potent sense 
of the pathological, the violent, the decaying and the dissolute as enduring, insistently, 
within the everyday experience of being human – rather than coming, unbidden, as 
an effractive force from the outside that disrupts an untroubled and pellucid self. We 
should not underestimate the signifi cance of this for helping build new directions for a 
critical medical humanities. For, even as there exist many exceptions to the rule, medi-
cal humanities has, to my mind, long been hampered by a frequent assumption that 
certain things that characterise human experience tend to line up, unproblematically, 
one alongside the other. A partial list might include: the readability of the body; the 
clarity of the communicative acts that are given through language and gesture; the urge 
to health; the ennobling achievements of aesthetic engagement; the succour offered by 
particular forms of narrative closure. If we were to pick out two instances in which this 
smooth passage is upset, we might note Garratt’s insistence that nineteenth-century 
writers frequently regarded ‘the literary–aesthetic realm . . . in itself as injurious or 
corrupting to health even while art is valorised as an imaginative or spiritual resource 
capable of transforming lived experience’,22 or Salisbury’s delicate reading of Woolf 
through which she cogently avers that, for Woolf, ‘illness is both the instigator of 
revelation and the normal run of things; illness marks the extraordinary as a quality 
furled inside the very fabric of the common.’23 
Such arguments often go hand in hand with the rendering visible of the heteroge-
neity of that domain of thought and practice we call medicine (as well as of the life 
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sciences that lie in such intimate relationship with it). In many of these essays, ‘medi-
cine’ appears in markedly different forms from those fl at, inert images that many of us 
in the medical humanities are too wont to conjure up. For if today’s default reaction 
amongst some humanities scholars is to lament the ‘biomedical reductionism’ of med-
icine and its allies – and, indeed, we see such laments in some of these essays – what 
is abundantly clear is the strangeness, perversity and cobbled-togetherness of much 
of what passes as the ‘medical’ or ‘clinical’ in these authors’ essays. Consider how 
Salisbury’s exploration of aphasia narrates complex passages that lead from the work 
of neurologist and psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein and Gestalt psychologist Adhémar 
Gelb to the phenomenological explorations of Merleau-Ponty. Here, the philosopher, 
the life scientist and the psychologist are equally preoccupied with understanding the 
complex tangle of the physiological, the psychological and the existential that might 
help to elucidate the human being’s projection ‘towards a “world” ’.24 Or consider 
the assemblage constituted by the clinician Cole, the psychologist McNeill, the phi-
losopher Gallagher and the patient Ian, who, together, tinker and experiment so as 
to produce new understandings of the semiotics, physiology and phenomenology of 
gesture in the unmarked as well as the ‘damaged’ body. 
Why Critical?
That no easy cut might be made between the ‘medical’ and the ‘humanities’ in 
many of these heterogeneous essays surely opens out new questions, frameworks 
and orienting ontologies for those of us intrigued by the promise of critical medi-
cal humanities.25 But we should note that these essays install various visions – both 
explicit and implicit – of what the ‘critical’ of the critical medical humanities is, 
and where it might take us. Some authors powerfully articulate a somewhat famil-
iar defence of the role that humanities research might play in relation to various 
shibboleths that characterise the domains of medical thinking and of therapeutic 
exhortations. Garratt, for example, turns to models of mental pathology within 
Victorian literary aesthetics in order to displace John Carey’s strange endorse-
ment of both a relativist account of aesthetic impact and a Leavisite shoring-up of 
where literary value and goodness lie. The efforts in the mid-nineteenth century to 
address how the senses and the nervous system are central to understanding the 
complex effects of artistic works on those who encounter them are, for Garratt, 
important correctives to today’s easy arguments surrounding the benefi ts of bib-
liotherapy. Here, then, engagement with the mid-nineteenth century’s ‘sometimes 
hidden aesthetic models’ might ‘historically enrich any current medical humanities 
research predicated on determining the relationship between the ends of aesthet-
ics and particular embodied subjects’.26 This sense of the humanities as ‘enriching’ 
is also found in Saunders’s claim that the medieval can ‘illuminate, complicate 
and validate’ current scientifi c and medical models;27 and in Cole and Gallagher’s 
conviction that phenomenological attention to the fi rst-person, patient perspective 
‘can help us understand more’.28 
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In other essays, the desire to intervene in the world – ontologically as well as episte-
mologically – is expressed more acutely. Herman is keen to draw from the ‘potentially 
revolutionary, paradigm-changing energies of “history from below” ’ in his call for 
new individual and collective stories that situate humans ‘within wider webs of crea-
tural life’.29 Guenther argues, with exquisitely calibrated anger, that what is required – 
if one accepts the implications of her argument about the strange logics of the 
death penalty – is not a philosophical clarifi cation of the distinctions between 
the humane and inhuman, or the proper and the improper, but ‘an abolition of 
the death penalty in all its forms, through a radical reconfi guring of meaning and 
power’.30 
These essays offer us varied accounts of the intellectual and political work that 
might be achieved within critical medical humanities if we tell different kinds of stories 
and depart from desiccated explanations of their ‘point’. They allow us to think more 
carefully about who, in relation to the areas of health and pathology, is granted the 
gravitas with which to denote, speak about and interpret a medical (or para-medical, 
or quasi-medical) scene. They put pressure on how the medical humanities too readily 
determines which kinds of mark, gesture and utterance might be endowed with mean-
ing, and which brushed aside as meaningless. And they push us to think more keenly 
about whose narratives about minds, bodies, imaginations and affects come to stick, 
and whose are structurally or implicitly foreclosed. 
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